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Abstract
We criticize the theories used to explain the size distribution of cities.
They take an empirical fact and work backward to obtain assumptions
on primitives. The induced theoretical assumptions on consumer be-
havior, particularly about their inability to insure against the city-level
productivity shocks in the model, are untenable. With either self insur-
ance or insurance markets, and either an arbitrarily small cost of moving
or the assumption that consumers do not perfectly observe the shocks
to rmstechnologies, the agents will never move. Even without these
frictions, our analysis yields another equilibrium with insurance where
consumers never move. Thus, insurance is a substitute for movement.
We propose an alternative class of models, involving extreme risk against
which consumers will not insure. Instead, they will move, generating
a Fréchet distribution of city sizes that is empirically competitive with
other models. JEL number: R12 Keywords: Zipfs Law, Gibrats
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
A small industry has developed that seeks to provide a theory to explain a
singular but robust stylized fact in urban growth: the size distribution of
cities. Zipfs law or the rank-size rule, as applied to the size distribution of
cities, states that for any country, the rank of a city according to population
(for example, New York is ranked number one in the US) multiplied by its
population is constant. Thus, Los Angeles has half the population of New
York, whereas Chicago has one third the population of New York. This
stylized fact or factoid holds across many countries and time periods, but it
is only one fact. In general, it is connected to Gibrats law, stating that
stochastic proportional growth tends to a lognormal distribution. The most
compelling empirical work in this area shows that the size distribution of cities
is lognormal (Eeckhout, 2004) when the data is not cut o¤ at an arbitrary
rank or population.1 For those unfamiliar with the empirics associated with
this literature, we display in Figure 1 a graph of Eeckhouts data, consisting
of more than 25,000 places from U.S. Census 2000. Since population on the
horizontal axis and rank on the vertical axis are both plotted in log scales, the
rank-size rule, taken literally, would say that the plot should be linear with
slope  1. Deviations from the rule or law at the top and bottom of the size
distribution are documented and discussed in the literature. See Gabaix and
Ioannides (2004) for a ne survey of the entire area of research.
1It is well known that the lognormal distribution applies not only to the size distribution
of cities, but to many phenomena in the physical sciences as well; see the survey by Limpert
et al (2001) with applications as broad as the length of sentences in the writings of George
Bernard Shaw to geology and plant physiology. Of particular interest is the literature
showing that rainfall (see Meneghini et al, 2001), soil moisture (see Janowicz et al, 2003),
and crop abundance (see Halloy, 1999) are distributed according to lognormal distributions.
In fact, Halloy (1999) displays graphs (see for example his gure 4) for crop abundance in
New Zealand from 1842 to 1990 that look very much like the graphs used to explain the size
distribution of cities. He also explains dynamics as in Duranton (2007).
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Figure 1: The rank-size rule. Data Source: Census 2000.
Explanation of this stylized fact or factoid by a theory has long been an
objective of urban economists; it is quite robust, but also very di¢ cult to
theorize about. Three recent articles, Eeckhout (2004), Duranton (2007), and
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), have made valiant attempts to tackle this
issue head on.
The models seeking to explain this factoid are developed working back-
wards from empirics. That is, they take the empirical fact and attempt rst
to explain it using a reduced form, generally stochastic in nature, and then
push this reduced form back to assumptions on primitives. As we shall see,
these assumptions on primitives generally do not look natural, in the sense
that if one were formulating a model of cities from scratch, it would not be
obvious that one would want to begin with these assumptions. In fact, the
literature of urban economics prior to the introduction of these models did not.
Moreover, since these models are constructed for a single purpose, namely to
explain an empirical factoid, they seem incapable of explaining other empiri-
cal regularities, though they seem to be judged exclusively on the basis of how
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well they explain the one empirical factoid.2 Finally, it is worthwhile to note
that there is likely an innite number of models capable of explaining the size
distribution of cities, and some of these might not even be stochastic; see, for
example, Fujita and Mori (1997).
We shall focus primarily on the behavior of consumers, in particular the
degree to which they can hedge against risk. Our ndings are as follows.
First, the type of risk featured in the literature is city-level risk in the form
of a shock each period to the city-wide production function. The shock is
known to all before they make their decisions, in particular consumer decisions
about location and consumption bundle. There is no aggregate risk, since
the number of cities are large and shocks are i.i.d., and this is often stated
explicitly in the papers. In this context, insurance is a perfect substitute for
consumer movement. We consider either self insurance, where a consumer
insures over time by borrowing or saving to smooth consumption, or insurance
markets, where a consumer insures using the fact that shocks are independent
over space at a given time. With either type of insurance (or a combination),
we nd an equilibrium that yields the same period by period utility for each
consumer as the one presented in the literature, where consumers move and
generate Zipfs law or Gibrats law. Our equilibrium features no consumer
movement. Moreover, with even arbitrarily small moving costs or arbitrarily
small uncertainty about shocks on the part of consumers, only our equilibrium
survives. The existing literature nds that initial conditions dont matter, in
that the size distribution of cities eventually tends toward lognormal. For our
equilibrium, initial conditions matter in that consumers never move.
Second, even aggregate risk is insu¢ cient to generate consumer movement.
For example, if there were a single aggregate shock common to all cities at each
time, consumers could still insure by smoothing consumption through saving
and borrowing over time and never moving.
Third, our proposed alternative model has aggregate risk of a specic kind.
In the context of perfect competition, each city receives a shock to its produc-
tivity at each time. Only the city with the best technology in an industry
produces at that time, driving out others. Our equilibrium has consumers
moving to the cities producing with the best technology for some industry at
that time. Insurance against shocks is too costly, as it is almost the total wage
in a productive city. Our framework leads not to the central limit theorem or
Gibrats law, but rather to extreme value theory (the analog of the central
2An exception is Duranton (2007), that explains 3 factoids.
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limit theorem for maximal values of a sequence of random variables instead
of averages) and the Fisher-Tippett (1928) theorem. The implied functional
form for the size distribution of cities is di¤erent from the predictions in the lit-
erature. Independence of shocks across time was a requirement of the original
Fisher-Tippett theorem, but is not required for modern versions.
The motivation for this paper is summarized as follows. First, we propose
a test of consistency of the models in the literature. Is the random variable
representing the uncertainty about a citys productivity observable to all? If
so, it is quite natural to allow insurance markets. Is insurance available? The
answer to the second question is negative for the models in this literature we
have seen, with no explanation. If insurance is inserted into the model, will
it make a di¤erence in the equilibrium and empirical prediction of the model?
Finally, can insurance cause an e¢ ciency loss?
We provide an alternative model where the random variable is observable
but the agents will never choose to use insurance. The equilibrium allocation is
rst best. In contrast with the extant literature, where insurance is implicitly
prohibited but would be taken up if it were available, it seems to us that ours
is a more productive approach.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in the balance of this section,
we shall discuss the literature that attempts to rene the stylized fact, namely
the rank-size rule, and explain it. Then in section 2 we shall raise specic
objections, involving insurance against city-level risk, to these models. In
section 3 we introduce Eeckhouts model and modify it to make the objections
formal. In section 4, we propose an alternative type of model to explain the
size distribution of cities, and implement it empirically. Section 5 contains a
brief discussion of how our results relate to the literature. Finally, in section
6, we shall discuss our conclusions and directions for future work.
1.2 The Older Literature
The innovative work of Gabaix (1999a, 1999b) is the source from which the
modern literature on the size distribution of cities ows. This work uses an
overlapping generations structure where consumers live for two periods. It is
assumed that moving costs are so high that consumers can only choose their
location (city) when they are young. This location decision is made after
shocks to production and amenities are realized for that period, and known to
all. The consumer/workers cannot move again when old. The wages or income
for the old in a city are never even specied, and it is simply assumed that the
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young make their decisions in a myopic manner. Moreover, the availability of
insurance or capital markets is never discussed, so it is unknown whether the
young can hedge against uncertainty about their wage when they are old in
the city they choose.
If the old people are immobile, why is this important? It is important be-
cause when the young make their decisions, they can anticipate what happens
when they are old, and might change their mind about their location decision
when young. In other words, they wont behave myopically. Without myopia,
insurance becomes important.
1.3 Recent Literature
Chief among recent work are Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), Duranton
(2006), Eeckhout (2004) and Duranton (2007). We focus on the latter two.
Eeckhouts model has consumers who are innitely lived with foresight
and who can move each period. There are technological shocks to production
in each city in each time period. It is movement of the consumer/worker
population in response to these shocks that generates Gibrats law. The shocks
generate changes in equilibrium wages, rents, and congestion across time and
space that correspond to the consumer movements that equalize utility levels
across space at each time. On p. 1445, the following statement is made:
Moreover, because there is no aggregate uncertainty over di¤erent locations,
and because capital markets are perfect, the location decision in each period
depends only on the current period utility. The problem is therefore a static
problem of maximizing current utility for a given population distribution, and
the population distribution must be such that in all cities, the population Si;t
equates utilities across cities.
Here we wish to make an important distinction between transfers of con-
sumption across time, namely perfect capital markets, and across states, namely
complete and perfect futures markets.
The actual consumer optimization problem does not involve state-dependent
assets nor does it allow state-contingent transfers of income. If it were to allow
this, as in a standard model of complete futures or insurance markets, then
agents would never move. They would simply buy assets at the start of time
that would pay them under a bad state in their city at a particular time, and
such that they would pay under a good realization in their city. In other
words, they would insure against the state of nature in their city.3
3It is important to recognize that in this model there are two factors determining a
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The basic model of Duranton (2007) has consumers maximizing an in-
tertemporal utility function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint,
without facing uncertainty. However, once the detailed urban features are
added (in Section V and Duranton, 2006), the model looks similar to Eeck-
houts at least in terms of the urban features. One simply needs some depen-
dence of local prices (land rents or wages) on the state of nature. Then utility
equalization implies that people will move depending on the state realization,
but this movement disappears if one allows insurance.
There isnt enough detail about the urban market in Duranton (2006, 2007)
to make specic statements about how insurance would work, but the con-
sumers in a city face uncertainty about employment due to the uncertainty
about innovations in various industries, so similar insurance arguments should
work if the details of the model are lled in.
The bottom line here is not that complete and perfect futures markets are
needed to upset the purpose of these rather fragile models. Rather, it is that
any insurance at all will do the trick. Then the question becomes whether
moving or buying insurance is cheaper for the consumers. If insurance is
incomplete, it can still hinder mobility. Typically in these models if moving
costs are positive, it makes sense for consumers to stay put.
2 The Issue
2.1 How Insurance Reduces Population Movement
So how might this insurance occur in practice? Lets assume either that
consumers cannot perfectly observe the technology shocks to cities, or moving
has a small cost, or both.
 Self insurance. Since consumers can transfer consumption across time,
and they know that shocks are i.i.d., then they can borrow or use their
savings in bad times and save (or pay o¤ their loans) in good, staying
in the same city. In the literature, the intertemporal uncertainty faced
by consumers does not show up in their objective function, whereas the
possibility of self insurance does not show up in the budget constraint.
worker/consumers productivity, namely the city-specic shock, and the externality in pro-
duction induced by total population in the city. Even if capital markets are perfect, the
production externality is not internalized (even with a land market), so the equilibrium
allocation is not necessarily rst best.
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The earlier quote from Eeckhout seems to imply that this is allowed, but
the formal statement of the consumer budget constraint makes it clear
that this is not allowed. This type of insurance exploits the fact that
for any given city, the shocks are i.i.d. over time. Empirically, the place
to look for self insurance is in the savings response to local employment
shocks.
 Insurance markets. In all of these models, at each time the state of
nature (the random shock to each production function for each city) is
known to all and veriable before consumers make their decisions about
consumption bundles and location. So this is a perfect setting for a
viable insurance market. An insurance rm can step in or the continuum
of consumers can simply pool resources in each period, smoothing their
consumption without changing location so it is independent of the state
in their city.4 This type of insurance exploits the fact that at any given
time, the shocks are i.i.d. across cities. Empirically, one place to look
for insurance is a cross-country comparison of how varying benets of
unemployment insurance a¤ect mobility in response to local employment
shocks.
 Futures markets. Consumers formulate plans to sell labor and buy
consumption commodity and housing contingent on every possible state
in every time period. There is no empirical complement. We mention
this for completeness.
For our criticism to apply, insurance via either of the vehicles mentioned
above need not be perfect. It only need be enough so that it throws o¤ the
mobility result, which requires that the response to shocks is only in consumer
movement, rents and congestion.
Given that for Gibrats law to hold, the shocks to each city in each period
must be small(see Eeckhout, 2004, p. 1447), it seems reasonable to think
that insurance would yield higher consumer utility than movement, if moving
costs are at all signicant or if consumers cannot observe shocks to rms per-
fectly, and thus face even a small amount of uncertainty in their optimization
problems.
4Although landlords (and the destination of land or housing rent) are not made explicit
in these models, they might wish to participate in the insurance market as well, since their
incomes uctuate with the state of nature in their city. Of course, risk aversion on the part
of landlords simply requires that their utility as a function of rental income be concave.
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We will show below that in general, for models in the literature, consumers
will choose to insure instead of move when insurance is available. A new
model in which people will choose not to insure but move even when insurance
is available is proposed below. A common feature of both the models in
the literature and the model presented below is the prediction that people
will move and not insure. Thus, if we were to look for empirical evidence
to distinguish among the models, evidence of substitution between movement
and insurance is insu¢ cient.5
2.2 Possible Objections to the Criticism
We emphasize that the criticism we make is a purely theoretical point con-
cerning models in the literature. Whether or not agents in the real world
actually insure against city-wide risk is not relevant to the question at hand.
Our point is that in the theoretical worlds of these models, insurance of the
sort discussed in the previous subsection is implicitly excluded. The reasons
are not given or, more importantly, included in the model. If these factors,
such as asymmetric information, are included in the model to explain insur-
ance market breakdown, other competing forces driving agglomeration can be
important; see for example Berliant and Kung (2008).6 In other words, this
criticism of the internal structure of the models, for example when there is a
non-zero moving cost, is that the consumers are not behaving rationally if they
dont insure.
Next we present a discussion of why insurance market breakdown is not
natural in the context of the models. Again, this is not meant to be a statement
about the real world, but rather about whether the exclusion of an insurance
option for consumers in the models makes sense.
The usual cause of a breakdown of insurance markets is adverse selection,
represented for example by cream-skimming on the part of insurance compa-
nies. In the models discussed here, the state is assumed realized and observable
to all before decisions are made in a given time period. So there is no issue of
adverse selection. But one can easily imagine variations of these models that
incorporate some form of information asymmetry. It would not be natural for,
say, only consumers to know the shock to the local economy, since the technol-
5The empirical investigation of the use of insurance as a substitute for migration, espe-
cially when consumer heterogeneity is taken into account, seems quite interesting as a topic
for future research.
6This work shows that adverse selection alone can generate agglomeration.
9
ogy shock really a¤ects rms. If only rms knew the realization of the shock
before making their decisions, then consumers could draw inferences from rm
behavior, or the consumers could self insure or insure. It is not clear what
hidden information or hidden action on the part of consumers would cause an
insurance market breakdown in this context. It is natural to assume that
amenities are observable.
One can imagine moral hazard at the city level with insurance markets,
in that a city might try to claim a productivity level lower than the actual
one so the residents can collect more insurance money. However, there are
no local governments in the models in the literature to coordinate this, and
the assumption is that local productivity is observable to all, including non-
residents of the city, when they make their location decisions.
Another objection that could be raised is the commitment required on the
part of consumers. In fact, commitment to a plan or contract is a requirement
of models that feature self insurance, insurance or futures markets generally.
For example, a consumer might experience regret over the purchase of a long-
term health insurance contract after the state of the world that tells them
that they are healthy is realized. Or the insurance company might experience
regret if the consumer turns out to be unhealthy. But they are committed to
their contracts. In the models of the size distribution of cities, for example,
one could begin the random process of technological change and at any point
in time, allow insurance and commitment to begin. Then the population
distribution will not change from that point on.
One might easily object to even small moving costs or even a small amount
of noise in consumer observations of shocks. Then what we present is an-
other equilibrium, that yields exactly the same period by period utility as the
equilibrium studied in this literature. This alternative equilibrium features a
uniform distribution of consumers, and does not generate Zipfs law.
Finally, there are costs associated with insurance contracts that, from the
point of view of consumers, must be balanced against the cost of moving. Such
costs involve lawyers and potentially complex transactions. Moreover, unem-
ployment insurance might fulll the role of explicit contracts. Self insurance
does not su¤er from these problems. But credit constraints could limit self
insurance. In any case, insurance does not need to be perfect. If there is
substitution between insurance and mobility, the type of mobility needed to
generate the various empirical distributions of city size can be upset.
But we emphasize again that although these various insurance market im-
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perfections can cause insurance market breakdown, their inclusion in a formal
model is necessary to ensure that consumers behave rationally when they dont
insure, and the consequences of their inclusion are far from obvious.
3 A Model from the Literature Modied to
Include Insurance
3.1 Notation
We use the model of Eeckhout (2004) as the basis for the analysis because it is
explicit about consumer behavior, in the form of an optimization problem, as
well as endogenous urban variables, namely local wages and land rents. We
conjecture that the other models in the literature can be modied in a similar
fashion.
The original model is specied as follows. For complete detail, see Eeck-
hout (2004, pp. 1445-1446).
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The set of cities is indexed by i; j 2 I.
Production is constant returns to scale. The measure of population in city
i at time t is Si;t, and let Ai;t be the technological productivity parameter of
city i at time t. This parameter follows the law of motion:
Ai;t = Ai;t 1(1 + i;t) (1)
where i;t is the exogenous technological shock to city i at time t. It is
assumed that i;t is i.i.d. with mean 0, symmetric, and satises 1 + i;t > 0.
The positive local externality (spillover) function is given by a+(Si;t) > 0,
where a0+(Si;t) > 0. The marginal product of a worker in city i at time t is
given by
yi;t = Ai;ta+(Si;t)
Consumers are innitely lived and identical. In city i at time t, consump-
tion good is ci;t, housing or land consumption is hi;t whereas leisure is 1  li;t
for labor supply li;t 2 [0; 1]. Utility for a consumer in city i at time t is
Cobb-Douglas:
u(ci;t; hi;t; li;t) = c

i;th

i;t(1  li;t)1  
with ; ;  +  2 (0; 1). For prices, let the consumption good be numéraire,
the price of housing or land in city i at time t be pi;t, and let the wage in city
i at time t be wi;t. The local negative externality or congestion function is
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given by a (Si;t) 2 [0; 1], where a0 (Si;t) < 0. The optimization problem of a
consumer in city i at time t is:
max
fci;t;hi;t;li;tg
ci;th

i;t(1  li;t)1  
subject to
ci;t + pi;thi;t  wi;tLi;t
where wi;t = Ai;ta+(Si;t) and Li;t = a (Si;t)li;t. Total land or housing in a city
is H. Using the rst order conditions from this optimization problem and
market clearance, equilibrium (denoted by asterisks) in city i at time t as a
function of population Si;t can be found:
pi;t =
Ai;ta+(Si;t)a (Si;t)Si;t
H
wi;t = Ai;ta+(Si;t)
ci;t = Ai;ta+(Si;t)a (Si;t)
hi;t =
H
Si;t
li;t = + 
The last equation in particular, indicating that labor supply is independent
of population, is an artifact of the Cobb-Douglas specication.
Substituting back into the utility function, indirect equilibrium utility as a
function of population u(Si;t) can be written as
u(Si;t) = [Ai;t  a+(Si;t)a (Si;t)]S i;t H[1    ]1   (2)
Under free mobility of consumers, indirect utility is equated across cities in
each time period, determining their populations as a function of their produc-
tivity and their realized history of shocks, summarized by Ai;t. Instantaneous
utility is constant over both time and location in equilibrium. Again using
Eeckhouts notation, call this instantaneous utility level U . Denote the local
size e¤ect as
(S) = a+(S)  a (S)  S =
3.2 Insurance
Let the discount factor be denoted by  2 (0; 1]. In correspondence with the
assumption of complete capital markets, it is assumed that all consumers can
borrow or lend at rate 1

  1. The consumer optimization problem (at time 0)
becomes:
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max
fci;t;hi;t;li;tg
1X
t=1
t  ci;thi;t(1  li;t)1  
subject to
1X
t=1
t  (ci;t + pi;thi;t) 
1X
t=1
t  wi;tLi;t
As stated by Eeckhout, the problem reduces to the one period optimization
problem if there is no insurance or futures markets. Formally, there should
be an expectation in the objective function and a requirement that the budget
constraint hold for every state of nature. However, this is omitted in the
literature since the problem is reduced to a static optimization problem where
the state of nature is observed before consumers make their choices.
There are several important points to be made at this juncture. First, it is
useful to imagine the consumers stepping back at t = 0 and making decisions
about their cities of residence and their consumption bundles for the entire
time stream of their innite lives, contingent on state realizations at each
time. Second, and more important, it does not matter which interpretation
of the model one employs. Specically, resources can be transferred across
states of the world (at any given time) in one or more of several ways. In the
end, what a consumer is choosing is their residence and consumption bundle
for every time and for every possible state of the world, optimizing utility
subject to the budget constraint. The state of the world at time t a¤ects the
optimization problem through the prices, pi;t and wi;t, and income (through
a (Si;t) and Li;t) only. These variables depend on Ai;t both directly and
indirectly, the latter because Si;t depends on Ai;t in equilibrium. The state
of the world at time t does not enter into the consumer optimization problem
otherwise. For example, it does not enter into the utility function. We could
index these prices and incomes by the state of the world, but that would only
serve to complicate notation.
As already mentioned, what will matter are only the lifetime choices of
residence and consumption bundles, contingent on the state of the world in
each period. The method used to actually implement them, via transfers
across states in a time period as opposed to across time periods, does not
matter; there are many possibilities. With complete futures markets, at time
t = 0 the consumers can sell their labor in every future time period and state,
buying consumption good and housing in every future time period and state.
With insurance markets, at t = 0 the consumers can buy actuarially fair
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insurance against price and income changes. With self insurance, they can
commit to a plan of borrowing and saving under all possible scenarios, namely
realizations of states in each time period.
To get the basic idea across, in the next subsection we show how insur-
ance would work from the beginning when all cities have the same initial
state (productivity) and population. This yields no movement at any time
in equilibrium. In the next subsection, we discuss how to extend this so that
insurance can begin from equilibrium of the model at any time t. From that
time on, there is no consumer movement unless the insurance is switched o¤.
3.2.1 Insurance when the initial state is the same for all cities
To illustrate the ideas behind insurance, we begin with an example where all
cities begin with the same state at time 0 and consumers insure from then on.
For notational purposes, let S be the mean population of cities, that is
S =
P
i2I Si;t
jIj , where j I j is the cardinality of the set I.7 Let A0 = Ai;0
denote the common initial technology level for all the identical cities before
the process begins. Let Si;0 = S for all cities i, so they all have the same
initial population. We assume that
U = u(S) = [A0  a+(S)a (S)]S H[1    ]1  
Thus, we assume for illustrative purposes that the initial conguration of shock
A0 and uniform population distribution S generate the instantaneous equilib-
rium utility. This is to get the idea across; in the next section, we will show
how to start insurance from equilibrium at an arbitrary given time. In either
case, no consumer movement will occur once insurance begins.
With insurance, self insurance, or a futures market (or some combination
of all 3), we propose the following equilibrium solution for all cities i and times
t:
pi;t =
A0a+(S)a (S)S
H
wi;t = A0a+(S)
ci;t = A0a+(S)a (S)
hi;t =
H
S
li;t = + 
7There are technical issues concerning the cardinality of I, but we shall ignore them here.
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In other words, this is the allocation generated by a constant, over both
time and state, allocation with a uniform distribution of consumers. By con-
struction, it generates the same instantaneous utility stream for all consumers
in all cities and in all times as both the initial distribution and the equilibrium
studied by Eeckhout.
But how does this work in a pragmatic sense? Regarding futures markets,
each consumer works the same hours, independent of state. If the state real-
ization is good, i.e. if the consumer is in city i at time 0 and Ai;t > A0, income
in excess of A0a+(S)  ( + ) is paid to the market. If the state realization
is bad, then the consumer receives income from the market, smoothing con-
sumption. Under self-insurance, the consumer commits to a plan of saving
income in a good state, and withdrawing from savings or borrowing in a bad
state, thus smoothing consumption. The banks know that E(Ai;t) = A0, so
they are willing to lend. Under mutual insurance, the same type of idea,
with commitment, has consumers who are in cities with good states at time t
contributing to an insurance pool, and those in cities with bad states receiving
payments from an insurance pool. If the number of cities is large, the law of
large numbers implies that the mutual insurance pool is solvent.
It is interesting to note that the phenomenon we describe is something like
another manifestation of Starretts spatial impossibility theorem (see Mills,
1967; Starrett, 1978; Fujita, 1986; and Fujita and Thisse, 2002 chapter 2.3),
though here markets are incomplete due to the presence of unpriced local
externalities, both positive and negative.
In summary, the equilibrium time path of utility for every consumer is the
same, and constant, under insurance and under the equilibrium that generates
movement and eventually becomes lognormal. At the very least, a discussion
of why the latter equilibrium is selected should be o¤ered in the literature.
With any moving cost, the insurance or futures market equilibrium (the
one denoted with bars) clearly dominates the path with asterisks, the one put
forth in the literature. Given a choice between moving along the equilibrium
path or insuring at t = 0, each consumer will individually choose to insure.
A second, and perhaps more reasonable possibility, is that consumers ob-
serve Ait imperfectly when they make their location decisions each period.
In that case as well, the consumers will insure rather than move, since they
are risk averse. This can be seen in equation (2). When consumers cannot
perfectly observe Ai;t, equilibrium expected utility will vary in proportion to
E(Ai;t)
.
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3.2.2 Insurance starting when the state is an equilibrium at a given
time
The preceding subsection was provided to give intuition. However, it has
drawbacks in terms of commitment on the part of consumers if they use mutual
insurance at each given time, and on the part of banks and consumers at time
0 if the consumers use self-insurance. Moreover, there is a strong assumption
that at time 0, A0 is the same across cities, each city has the same population
S, and this combination produces the instantaneous equilibrium utility level.
Here we discuss how to dispense with some of these assumptions.
Suppose that we start running the model without insurance, so that con-
sumers are generally moving around, and stop it at some arbitrary time t. At
this time, the instantaneous utility level of each consumer is, of course, U .
Consider a consumer in city i and the possibility of self insurance. At that
point, the productivity parameter in the city is Ai;t, and everyone knows from
equation (1) that for t0 > t, E(Ai;t0) = Ai;t. So if the consumers in that city
freeze their consumption bundle at whatever it is at that time, and commit to
staying in that city and consuming that consumption bundle forever through
a plan of borrowing and saving, they will obtain utility level U in each period.
This exploits the law of large numbers over time.
Mutual insurance, exploiting the law of large numbers over space at a
given time, is more interesting. Pick an arbitrary time t and freeze all the
consumers in their equilibrium locations as well as their consumption bundles.
All consumers obtain utility U in this situation at time t. Now consider what
would happen if they maintain the same location and consumption bundle in
time t+ 1. Given equation (1), the surplus or decit in total wage payments
for city i is
i;t+1  Ai;t  a+(Si;t)  (+ )  Si;t
Thus, to ensure that this system of mutual insurance across cities is solvent at
time t+ 1, it is necessary thatX
i2I
1
j I j  i;t+1  Ai;t  a+(Si;t)  (+ )  Si;t = 0
Although this cannot be assured for nite j I j, we can see that as the number
of cities j I j tends to innity, the limiting result is a consequence of a law of
large numbers with weights given by 1jIj  Ai;t  a+(Si;t)  ( + )  Si;t. In fact,
Eeckhout (or a little algebra) shows that there is a constant K such that
Ai;t  (Si;t) = K
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so the weight attached to i;t+1 can be written as
1
j I j 
K
(Si;t)
 a+(Si;t)  (+ )  Si;t = 1j I j K  a (Si;t)  (+ )  S
1+=
i;t
Since the support of the random variable 1+i;t is contained in (0; 2), equation
(1) implies that the size of Ai;t at given time t can be bounded over i by 2tAi;0.
Since Ai;t and Si;t are positively related, there is also a bound for Si;t for xed
t over i. There is an extensive literature on law of large numbers for sums of
weighted random variables. Our framework would t, for example, in Cabrera
and Volodin (2005, Corollary 1).
Notice that there is no commitment required under mutual insurance be-
yond the next period. So it can be switched on and o¤ as desired, with no
consumer movement when it is on, and movement when it is o¤.
4 Modeling the Size Distribution of Cities
4.1 A Model
This model is loosely based on Duranton (2007), but in the context of perfect
competition8 instead of monopolistic competition. It can also be viewed as
a slice of a larger model that would include both our model and the model
of Eaton and Kortum (2002). Our model adds labor and consumer mobility,
whereas their model has them xed. In contrast with the other models in
the literature, there is economy-wide risk in addition to city-level risk. But
this in itself is not su¢ cient to generate consumer movement. For example,
if all cities faced the same shock at each time, namely Ajt is independent of j,
consumers could still insure against this risk by smoothing their consumption
through borrowing and saving. Thus, we employ a more extreme form of
aggregate risk.
Time is discrete and all consumers are innitely lived. Assume that there
are many cities (indexed by j = 1; :::;m) and many industries, each producing
one consumption commodity (indexed by i = 1; :::; n). All commodities are
freely mobile. The production function for commodity i in city j at time t is
given by
yijt = Aijt  lijt
8Since there is no market failure built into our model, equilibrium allocations will be
Pareto optimal.
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where yijt is the output of commodity i in city j at time t, and lijt is labor
input. The random variable Aijt 2 R++ will be discussed in detail shortly.
Suppose that each consumer supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically and that
the total number of consumers as well as total labor supply is given by N .9
We justify the assumption of perfect competition by implicitly assuming that
there is a large number of rms in each city capable of producing a commodity
using a constant returns technology, but all experiencing the same city-wide
technology shock.
In each time period t, each city j receives a random draw for its productivity
in producing commodity i, namely Aijt. Since we will be using the Fisher-
Tippet limit theorem from extreme value theory rather than the central limit
theorem, there is no requirement that these random variables be independent.
It is assumed that with probability 1, the random draws for 2 industries at time
t for city i are not both maximal among all cities for these given industries.
In equilibrium, only the cities with the highest draw of the random variable
for some industry will have employees and population. (Alternatively, we
could simply classify cities exogenously by industry, and assume that a city in
an industry receives only a draw for that industry.) Extensions that imply
several cities produce in equilibrium will be discussed shortly, but rst we must
explain the basic model.
The wage rate for the (freely mobile) population of consumers is given by
w(t). In equilibrium, it will be the same across industries.
As is standard in this literature, the utility function of a consumer at time
t is given by
u(t) =
nX
i=1
1
n
ci(t)

where ci(t) is the consumption of commodity i by a consumer at time t and
 2 (0; 1). Let pi(t) be the price of commodity i at time t. Then a consumers
budget constraint is
nX
i=1
pi(t)  ci(t) = w(t)
Let (t) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint in
the consumer optimization problem. Standard calculations yield demand for
9The assumption of Starretts spatial impossibility theorem that is violated by this model
is the assumption of location-independent production sets.
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commodity i at time t for a single consumer di(t):
di(t) =


 (t)n  pi(t)
 1
1 
Aggregate demand is given by
N  di(t) = N


 (t)n  pi(t)
 1
1 
Prot optimization yields, for each t:
For i = 1; :::; n, for j with Aijt = max
1jm, 0t0t
Aijt0
pi(t)  Aijt = w(t)
Here we are assuming total recall, in that the best technology from the past is
remembered, so new technologies are not used unless they are better than all
the old ones. Also, only the best technology in industry i survives, where the
best is across all cities and previous time periods. This assumption is made
for convenience. We discuss it more below.
Hence
For i = 1; :::; n, for j with Aijt = max
1jm, 0t0t
Aijt0
pi(t) =
w(t)
Aijt
(3)
In other words, even though wage is constant across occupied cities, output
price varies inversely with the production shock. Consumption commodity
market clearance requires, for each t:
For i = 1; :::; n, for j with Aijt = max
1jm, 0t0t
Aijt0
lijt  Aijt = N  di(t) = N


 (t)n  pi(t)
 1
1 
(4)
This is the key equation for our analysis.10
Setting the constant (t) to be
(t) = N


 (t)  n  w(t)
 1
1 
10Labor market clearance requires, for each t:
nX
i=1
X
f j with Aijt=max1jm, 0t0t Aijt0g
lijt = N
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and using (3) and (4), we obtain
For i = 1; :::; n, for j with Aijt = max
1jm, 0t0t
Aijt0
lijt  (Aijt)

 1 = (t)
Hence
For i = 1; :::; n, for j with Aijt = max
1jm, 0t0t
Aijt0 (5)
lijt = (t)  (Aijt)

1 
Since  < 1, labor usage lijt and the shock Aijt are positively correlated.
Notice that cities that do not have an industry with the largest shock in that
industry at time t are empty.11
The original work on the asymptotic distribution of maxima drawn from
a distribution is due to Fisher and Tippett (1928). Modern, more general
treatments are given in Coles (2001) and Embrechts et al (1997). We shall
return to a discussion of extreme value theory momentarily, but rst we will
draw the implications for our analysis.
The bottom line from this literature is that Aijt has an asymptotic distri-
bution of the following form, known as the generalized extreme value (GEV)
distribution:
FGEV (x) =
(
expf [1 + b(x  u)]  1 g when  6= 0
expf  exp( b(x  u))g when  = 0
Notice that there are 3 free parameters to be estimated here, namely b,
u, and . Also notice that to use rank as the left hand side variable in the
regression, one simply computes 1 FGEV (x). But from a pragmatic point of
view, it is easier to simply use ln(FGEV (x)) as the left hand side variable.
If there are no upper or lower bounds on the distribution, then  = 0 and
the distribution is Gumbel. If there is an upper bound on the distribution,
then  < 0 and the distribution is reverse Weibull. If there is a lower bound
on the distribution, for example 0 in our case, then  > 0 and the distribution
is Fréchet.
11Existence of an equilibrium is not an issue here, since the equilibrium prices and quanti-
ties can be solved analytically. For example, at t = 1, setting p1(1) = 1, then w(1) = A1j1,
pi(1) = A1jt=Aijt, (1) =   nA1j1 (
Pn
i=1A

1 
ij1)
1  , lij1 = N(  (1)nA1j1 )
1
1 A

1 
ij1 , and
so forth. Thus, equilibrium is also unique.
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Substituting (5),
ln(F (l)) =
(
 [1 + b(( l
(t)
)
1 
   u)]  1 when  6= 0
  exp( b(( l
(t)
)
1 
   u)) when  = 0 (6)
Notice that if we use cross section data, then t and hence (t) is constant.
Thus, in addition to the 3 parameters for the distribution of Aijt (namely b, u
and ), for the distribution of lijt there are two additional parameters, namely
 and .
In conclusion, we note that consumers will not want to insure against this
risk. If only a small percentage of cities produce at any time, then insurance
would cost only slightly less than the wage, so the consumers might as well
move and receive the wage in each period. For example, to keep things simple
suppose that there are 100 industries (or consumption commodities) and 100
cities in each industry (that is, each city is capable of producing only one
commodity). Then there is only one city producing in each industry at each
given time, and 100 cities out of 10,000 producing in each given time. As
time plays out, as long as some consumers are willing to move, each of the
cities producing at a given time will eventually be replaced by another in the
industry. The city using old technology has zero wage and no production.
So if some workers dont move, their average wage tends to one percent of
the expected new wage with time. Under symmetry of cities in an industry,
actuarially fair insurance would cost 99% of the expected new wage. In other
words, if workers move they will receive the wage next period, but if they
insure they will receive 1% of the wage next period. The only way workers
wont move is if they all agree to use old, frozen technology in each industry,
and collude so that none will move for a higher wage. In contrast, we assume
competitive behavior.
As previously remarked, in the real world the absence of insurance markets
generally for regional shocks is not useful for distinguishing among the mod-
els. An advantage of our model is that it can explain endogenously the lack
of insurance markets, whereas the other models implicitly assume that such
markets do not exist. We will remark on the welfare implications of insurance
in section 5 below.
The consumers still might want to insure against aggregate wage volatility
(namely movement in w(t) over time) by saving and borrowing to smooth
consumption, but their spatial distribution is still as we have laid out.
Returning now to our assumptions and extreme value theory, the original
theory of Fisher and Tippett presumed that, xing i, the random variables,
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Aijt in our case, were i.i.d. across j and t. Of course, in our context this makes
little sense. In general, the city with the best technology for some good i at
a particular time t is more likely to innovate and produce a better technology
for the next period than an arbitrary city. Moreover, it is possible that cities
nearby are more likely to innovate than an arbitrary city. Fortunately, much
progress has been made in extreme value theory since 1928. The modern
versions of the Fisher-Tippett theorem, as given by Coles (2001, Theorem 5.1)
and Embrechts et al (1997, Theorem 4.4.1) allow some dependence. Speci-
cally, what is required is that the sequence of random variables be stationary
and that a form of asymptotic independence (as blocks of random variables
become farther apart in time) hold.12 It is also important to note that the
model and results can be extended to the case where more than one city in an
industry produces. This could happen, for example, if there is transportation
cost for consumption goods between cities, so a city with a high realization of
productivity for a commodity, but not the highest, might serve a local market.
It turns out that extreme value theory applies not only to the maximum of a
sequence of random variables, but also to the upper order statistics. A de-
tailed discussion of the results can be found in Embrechts et al (1997, Section
4.2).
A few more remarks are in order. First, the role of having di¤erent indus-
tries i, as in the other models in the literature, is to generate a full distribution
of limiting populations rather than just one realization of the asymptotic dis-
tribution of city populations. Second, in contrast with other models in the
literature, the cities without the best technology for some industry at a given
time have zero population, so they dont show up in the data because they are
rural. Third, the derivations above work ne if there is not complete recall of
previous technologies. For instance, if there were no recall, then the realiza-
tions of random variables for all cities at one time are independent of those at
another time, so we have a form of block independence that is commonly used
in extreme value theory.
4.2 Empirical Implementation
Notice that we are not overly concerned with identication of the 5 parameters
in equation (6). As in the balance of the literature on the size distribution of
12An easy way to t our structure into the theory is to x an industry i and imagine that
at each time t, there are m subperiods. A city j draws its random variable Aijt in subperiod
j of time t.
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cities, these are just the parameters of a reduced form equilibrium distribution
implied by a theory. In essence, the parameters are identied by the functional
form itself. The economic interpretation of these variables is as follows. The
three parameters of the GEV distribution, b, u, and , are analogous to the
mean and variance of the lognormal distribution estimated by Eeckhout, or the
regression coe¢ cients estimated for Zipfs law using a log-log regression. They
have no direct economic interpretation. Since  and  are derived from the
model, they do have an economic interpretation. Standard calculations tell us
that 1
1  is the elasticity of substitution for consumers between consumption
commodities. The endogenous variable  is more di¢ cult to interpret, since
it involves a number of endogenous variables as well as random variables. But
equation (5) gives us the equilibrium relationship between the random variable
representing productivity in an industry (exogenous) and employment in that
industry (endogenous). So (t) tells us equilibrium employment in an industry
where one unit of labor produces one unit of consumption commodity.
We use the Census 2000 data set also used by Eeckhout.
As noted in the sources we cite for extreme value theory, the most common
method of estimating extreme value distributions is to use maximum likeli-
hood. The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) does not yield the smallest
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic in our data set. The KS statistic mea-
sures the maximum distance between a sample distribution and its estimate.
As noted by Goldstein et al (2004) in the context of social networks and later
by Eeckhout (2007) in the context of the size distribution of cities, using a
simple log-log regression can lead to serious statistical problems. The use of
MLE and the KS statistic is preferred. It is interesting to note that both the
literature on estimation of the GEV distribution and the literature on Zipfs
law seem to be (independently) converging on MLE as the preferred method
of estimation.
For purposes of comparison with Eeckhout (2004), we produce estimates
using each of the lognormal (his) distribution and the generalized extreme value
(our) distribution using equation (6), for both maximum likelihood estimation
and minimization of the KS statistic.13 The tables below summarize the
estimation results. The results of maximum likelihood estimation for the
lognormal distribution are identical to Eeckhouts.
13As usual, with any numerical maximum likelihood estimate, one can never be sure that
one has found a global maximum. The analog applies to minimization of the KS statistic.
23
Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Distribution Parameter Estimates KS statistic
Lognormal b = 7:2775, b = 1:7540 :018913
GEV bb = 1:624, bu = 1:5959, b = 102:00, b = :80990, b = :13726 :006985
Table 2: Estimation by Minimizing Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic
Distribution Parameter Estimates KS statistic
Lognormal b = 7:2496, b = 1:7375 :013378
GEV bb = 1:6274, bu = 1:5959, b = 102:00, b = :80990, b = :1373 :006967
Notice that since b > 0, we indeed obtain a Fréchet distribution.
Of course, the comparison between lognormal and GEV is not quite fair,
since there are only two parameters in the lognormal distribution whereas there
are ve parameters in the generalized extreme value distribution, and these
parameters do not contain the parameters used for the lognormal distribution.
Graphically (in color), the estimates and data plots follow.
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Figure 2: Maximum likelihood estimation of the lognormal distribution
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Figure 3: Maximum likelihood estimation of the generalized extreme value
distribution
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Figure 4: Estimation of the lognormal distribution by minimizing the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic
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Figure 5: Estimation of the generalized extreme value distribution by
minimizing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic
We also perform maximum likelihood estimation for the Census 2000 sam-
ple of 922 metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas:
Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation - Subsample
Distribution Parameter Estimates KS statistic
Lognormal b = 11:46, b = 1:190 :1124
GEV bb = 3:644, bu = 2:400, b = 50:00, b = :8899, b = :01600 :04112
In summary, estimates using the generalized extreme value distribution are
quite competitive.
5 Discussion
First, it is important to note that the models of Duranton and Eeckhout fea-
ture equilibrium allocations that are second best, whereas the model we have
developed features an equilibrium allocation that is e¢ cient. In Eeckhouts
model, equilibrium allocations might be ine¢ cient due to both positive and
negative externalities that are functions of city population, as detailed above.
Duranton uses a quality ladder model with imperfect competition. So state-
ments about welfare in either of these models must account for the theory of
the second best.
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Either a cost of moving or insurance can reduce equilibrium movement in
any of these models. For simplicity, we refer to them as mobility inhibitors.
There is a small puzzle in the relationship of the models to mobility in-
hibitors. In the model we have advanced here, staying in the same location
instead of moving to productive locations has a large cost, both social and pri-
vate, in that workers are not at the locations that are producing. Equilibrium
allocations are rst best because the workers themselves perceive the cost of
not moving, so they move. In Eeckhouts model, the puzzle is: why dont
workers all move to the cities with the highest productivity? It is obvious
that output would rise relative to the equilibrium allocation. The resolution,
almost obvious, is that the negative crowding externality represented by a 
becomes very important when city population is large. In fact, since utility is
equalized across cities in equilibrium, although output would rise if all workers
moved to the most productive cities, utility would decline in these cities rela-
tive to the equilibrium level. Thus workers perceive the private cost, and to
some degree the social cost, of moving to the most productive cities. In Eeck-
houts model with mobility inhibitors, the workers again perceive the private
costs and to some degree the social costs of moving.
This same puzzle is much more interesting in Durantons model. But we
must give some background for the model rst. Labor is used in each industry
by the quality leader, a monopolist, and by rms for research to produce the
next innovation. In the basic model with no mobility inhibitors, wage is the
same in all cities at equilibrium. In a steady state, it is also constant over
time. However, consumersutility rises over time due to decreasing quality
adjusted prices of the commodities they consume. Thus, workers perceive the
private cost of moving, equal to zero. But there may be social value to moving
to become a researcher, since more research would imply a faster decrease in
quality adjusted prices, and thus higher utility. We have not explicitly put
mobility inhibitors into this model, but it seems clear that workers would
perceive the private costs of moving or staying put when there is either a
moving cost or insurance. What they would not perceive completely when
making their decision is the social cost or benet.
6 Conclusions
So whats the point? Well, actually, there are several related points.
 First, when a model, markedly di¤erent from those found previously
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in the literature, is constructed to explain a specic empirical phenom-
enon, the microeconomic, structural assumptions about individual be-
havior and markets must make sense. Here, there is a rather obvious
problem that self-insurance and insurance markets are assumed not to
be functional. Models in the literature feature city-level risk, and it
is generally possible to insure against such risk through many vehicles,
barring asymmetric information. The latter does not arise naturally in
these models, since consumers are assumed to know the state of nature
before making their location and consumption decisions.
 With time in the model, it is even possible to insure against aggregate
risk through borrowing and saving.
 However, it is much more di¢ cult to insure against extreme aggregate
risk, so we propose such a model. Our model begins with microfounda-
tions and delivers a di¤erent functional form for the size distribution of
cities than has been used in the literature.
 When one tests a model of the size distribution of cities, the real test is
not whether it can explain the phenomenon it was specically designed
to explain, but rather whether it is also consistent with regularities that
it was not explicitly designed to explain.
Regarding the last item, it is convenient to use an analogy with the agglom-
eration literature. Cities happen. But that does not provide evidence that
any particular model of agglomeration and city formation is correct; there is
now a large variety of such models. Further testable hypotheses and evidence,
such as predictions about trade, land rent, and wages, are necessary to tease
out the contributions of various forces and models. The literature on the size
distributions of cities could learn from this example.
In summary, we began with a criticism of the literature based on the fact
that a primitive assumption in previous work, that consumers cannot insure
(either by borrowing and saving or by pooling resources) against the random
productivity variable for each city that is observable to all. Taking Eeckhouts
(2004) model as an example, we showed that if insurance is allowed, there is
another equilibrium of the model with a uniform distribution of consumers
where there is never any migration. Instead, consumers insure against the
risk, and the utility stream they obtain in this manner is the same as that in
the equilibrium used in the literature. If there is any moving cost or residual
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uncertainty, the equilibrium used in the literature disappears. Finally, we
propose an alternative model based on primitive assumptions, not designed to
match any particular empirical factoid. Insurance is allowed, but consumers
will never use it, as it is very costly. Instead, they move. The new model
is based on extreme value theory and yields a functional form for the size
distribution of cities di¤erent from the other models, and this prediction is
empirically competitive with the ones in the literature.
Future work includes testing further predictions of the model, for exam-
ple the wage and rent distributions when transport costs for consumption
commodities are introduced, and applying the model in new (but appropriate)
contexts, such as nance (see Gabaix et al., 2003, for an application of Gibrats
law to nance). Another interesting direction is to merge our model with that
of Eaton and Kortum (2002), though it is unclear if the added complication
would make simply adding an iceberg transportation cost to our model more
worthwhile.
References
[1] Berliant, M., and F.-c. Kung, 2008, Can Information Asymmetry Cause
Agglomeration?Working paper.
[2] Cabrera, M.O., and A.I. Volodin, 2005. Mean Convergence Theorems
and Weak Laws of Large Numbers for Weighted Sums of Random Vari-
ables under a Condition of Weighted Integrability. Journal of Mathe-
matical Analysis and Applications 305, 644-658.
[3] Coles, S., 2001. An Introduction to Statistical Modelling of Extreme Val-
ues. Springer-Verlag.
[4] Duranton, Gilles, 2006. Some Foundations for Zipfs Law: Product Pro-
liferation and Local Spillovers. Regional Science and Urban Economics
36(4), 542-563.
[5] Duranton, Gilles, 2007. Urban Evolutions: The Fast, The Slow, and
the Still. American Economic Review 97(1), 197-221.
[6] Eaton, J., and S. Kortum, 2002. Technology, Geography, and Trade.
Econometrica 70(5), 1741-1779.
29
[7] Eeckhout, J., 2004. Gibrats Law for (All) Cities. American Economic
Review 94(5), 1429-1451.
[8] Eeckhout, J., 2007. Gibrats Law for (All) Cities: Reply. Working
paper.
[9] Embrechts, P., Kluppelberg, C., and T. Mikosch, 1997. Modelling Ex-
tremal Events. Springer-Verlag.
[10] Fisher, R.A., and L.H.C. Tippett, 1928. Limiting Forms of the Fre-
quency by Distribution of the Largest or Smallest Members of a Sample.
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 180-190.
[11] Fujita, M., 1986. Urban land use theory, in Location Theory. Edited by J.
Lesourne and H. Sonnenschein. New York: Harwood Academic Publish-
ers.
[12] Fujita, M., and T. Mori, 1997. Structural Stability and Evolution of
Urban Systems.Regional Science and Urban Economics 27, 399442.
[13] Fujita, M. and J.-F. Thisse, 2002, Economics of Agglomeration. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
[14] Gabaix, X., 1999a. Zipfs Law for Cities: An Explanation. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 114(3), 739-767.
[15] Gabaix, X., 1999b. Zipfs Law and the Growth of Cities. American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 89(2), 129-132.
[16] Gabaix, X.; Gopikrishnan, P.; Plerou, V. and H. E. Stanley, 2003. A
Theory of Power Law Distributions in Financial Market Fluctuations.
Nature 423, 267-70.
[17] Gabaix, Xavier and Y. Ioannides, 2004. Evolution of City Size Distri-
butions.Chapter 53, 23412378, in J. Vernon Henderson and Jacques-
Francois Thisse, eds., Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics IV:
Cities and Geography, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[18] Goldstein, M.L.; Morris, S.A. and G.G. Yen, 2004. Problems with Fit-
ting to the Power-Law Distribution. The European Physical Journal B
- Condensed Matter Physics 41(2), 255-258.
30
[19] Halloy, Stephan R.P., 1999. The Dynamic Contribution of New Crops
to the Agricultural Economy: Is it Predictable? Perspectives on New
Crops and New Uses, J. Janick (ed.), ASHS Press, Alexandria, VA.
[20] Janowicz, J.R.; Gray, D.M. and J.W. Pomeroy, 2003. Spatial Variabil-
ity of Fall Soil Moisture and Spring Snow Water Equivalent Within a
Mountainous Sub-Arctic Watershed. 60th Eastern Snow Conference,
Sherbrooke, Québec, Canada.
[21] Limpert, Eckhard; Staehl, Werner A. and Markus Abbt, 2001. Log-
normal Distributions across the Sciences: Keys and Clues. Bioscience
51(5), 341-352.
[22] Meneghini, R.; Jones, J.A.; Iguchi, T.; Okamoto, K.; and Kwiatkowski,
J., 2001. Statistical Methods of Estimating Average Rainfall over Large
Space-Timescales Using Data from the TRMM Precipitation Radar.
Journal of Applied Meteorology 40(3), 568-585.
[23] Mills, E.S., 1967. An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a
Metropolitan Area.American Economic Review 57(2), 197-210.
[24] Rossi-Hansberg, E. and M.L.J. Wright, 2007. Urban Structure and
Growth. The Review of Economic Studies 74(2), 597-624.
[25] Starrett, D., 1978. Market allocations of location choice in a model with
free mobility, Journal of Economic Theory 17, 21-37.
31
